

# A Spatial Voting Model of Electoral Competition with Non-Fixed Number of Voters

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## Abstract

In this paper, we extend the spatial voting approach to investigate the role of political parties' campaign spending on increasing their poll and eventually ascertaining the outcome of electoral competition. We assume that the number of voters is not fixed and political parties are allowed to spend in their campaign in order to increase the density of their voters. To deal with this issue, we propose an extension of the standard two-party spatial voting model to explicitly endogenize the campaign investment on voters' density. In this model, while each party's campaign spending increases the density of his voters, it has a negative effect on the rival's poll and reduces their density. In a two-stage noncooperative one-shot game under imperfect, symmetric and complete information, each office-seeking party will choose strategically his political platform in the first stage and determine his level of investment in the second stage. Our results will suggest that how one party can win the election even when the other one is very close to the median voter.

**Keywords:** Electoral competition, Spatial model, Voters' density

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